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I. INTRODUCTION
Conscience, like most words that describe human experience and
recommend human action, has changed its meanings over time and takes 
on subtly different meanings in different contexts.1  Since the time of
Thomas Aquinas, when conscience referred to moral judgments about
action, and our founding era, when “freedom of conscience” dominantly
referred to individual religious liberty, our understanding has evolved. 
In this paper, I concentrate on present usage.  My aims are partially 
descriptive and mainly normative.  My hope is that by clarifying various 
ways the notion of conscience is conceived, I can contribute to a 
thoughtful elaboration of normative issues concerning responses to 
assertions of conscience and to near relatives of such assertions.  This
essay is modest in two important senses.  I neither try to develop a full
* University Professor, Columbia University, teaching at Columbia Law School. 
1. See Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious
Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 225–33 (2009); Michael J. White, The First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses: “Freedom of Conscience” Versus Institutional Accommodation, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010). 
 901























     
theoretical account of the distinctions I suggest nor do I try to resolve the 
hard questions about when legal accommodations to conscience should 
be extended.
Among the questions I address are these: How do claims of conscience 
relate to the entire domain of moral judgments?  Do claims of conscience
reach beyond moral judgments?  Are all claims of conscience religious? If
not, what does it take to make a claim religious?  Do religious claims of 
conscience often, or sometimes, warrant more respect or protection than 
nonreligious ones?  Some of these questions are daunting, and I do not
aspire to give them definitive answers, if indeed they are capable of such
answers.  But I hope to suggest nuances that will increase awareness of 
what is at stake. 
Three kinds of distinctions are important throughout my treatment.  In
respect to the obvious one between religious and nonreligious claims, I 
oversimplify to a degree by mainly assuming that religious claims of
conscience are moral ones with a religious base.  Sometimes writers
distinguish between moral claims of conscience and religious claims, but 
typical claims of conscience by religious believers are assertions about
what is morally required.  A religious Quaker conceives killing in war as
morally wrong; religious persons who refuse to participate in abortions 
believe it would be morally wrong to do so.  Some perceived religious 
obligations, such as daily prayer or wearing a yarmulke, are nonmoral, 
unless “moral” is understood very broadly.  But in most of my discussion 
this qualification is not important. 
One can refer broadly to accommodations of conscience, but in 
developing public policy, it is crucial to reflect on the grounds for 
accommodation and what specifically should be done to accommodate. 
Someone may believe that the vindication of certain claims is a basic 
human right, one that every government, or every modern government, 
has an obligation to respect.2  A person may think that most governments 
would wisely and desirably treat other claims as rights but would not 
assert that nonrecognition of these violates a basic human right.  A third 
category is claims that are best left to individual decisionmakers.  The
line between a right and a privilege granted by discretion is less than 
sharp.  A right formulated in flexible terms that takes into account all 
competing interests may amount in practice to an exercise of discretion
that courts will hesitate to overturn.  A possible fourth category is claims 
that should be rejected in all instances.
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 999, 1012 (2010). 
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The creation of rights by governments can take place at different
levels; they appear in constitutions, statutes, executive regulations, and
judicial pronouncements.  The stronger the argument that something is a 
basic human right, the more compelling is the contention that it belongs 
in the written constitution, if there is one, and in transnational documents
protecting such rights.  Once a constitution is in place, its interpretation 
is a highly significant component of defining rights—a component that 
receives little attention in what follows.3  When legislative measures are
involved, these may simply relieve rights bearers of what would otherwise 
be legal requirements, but they may go further and protect certain
actions from being treated by private employers or other private entities 
as the basis for adverse consequences. Even when the law leaves them
free to do what they wish, private businesses and nonstate entities, such 
as hospitals and universities, may create rights that operate internally.
Whether accommodations take place by right or by individual discretion, a 
vital question involves their extent.  Are the individuals relieved only of
compelled performance or also from adverse consequences? 
A third kind of distinction is between what we might regard as ideal if 
we put aside difficulties of categorization, fact-finding, and practical 
administration, and what we think makes sense in our actual social and
legal environments.  Realistic formulations of rights and discretionary
judgments must take into account both the nontransparency of true 
convictions and effective administration.  In what follows, I will 
occasionally mention, but without detailed analysis, the need of 
lawmakers and others to develop legal standards that are workable. 
II. CLAIMS OF CONSCIENCE AND THE DOMAIN OF MORAL CHOICE
How do claims of conscience relate to the entire domain of what 
people think they are morally required to do or morally should do?  In
particular, do such claims encompass choices of lesser moral importance 
and significant choices that do not concern morality?  In some uses, the 
word conscience does not carry an implication of great significance and 
need not implicate morality.  Nonetheless, I believe rights of conscience 
3. For a more in-depth discussion on this point, see 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006) (containing
many of the Author’s views about how constitutional free exercise rights have been and 
should be interpreted). 
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are ordinarily conceived, and should be conceived, as concerning judgments 
believed by those making them to be of considerable moral importance. 
Some uses of conscience do not include magnitude.  I might say, “I 
have a guilty conscience about that” to express a disquiet about something I
have done that seems morally wrong, such as failing to wash the dishes 
when I am aware they will be done by an overworked spouse, even if the 
particular wrong is comparatively trivial.  I might also say, “I am not 
sure what is the right thing to do, but my conscience tells me A is wrong” to
indicate an intuitive feeling rather than a deliberative judgment.  Again, 
A would not need to be a serious moral wrong. But when someone
sincerely claims “an objection in conscience” to performing an act, that
person does see performance as involving a substantial wrong.  When
preparing for a conference on rights of conscience to refuse to participate in
forms of healthcare, I thought of a nurse who regarded much optional 
plastic surgery as a wasteful reflection of a self-centered, materialist culture.
I assumed that she felt that a person who receives such surgery is
morally at fault and that her own cooperation is morally less desirable
than helping with needed medical services, but she does not think she
would be committing a serious moral wrong by participating.  She 
would have a moral objection to helping with such operations that would
not amount to a claim of conscience to avoid participating.4 
More recently, I have reflected on a long past example from my own 
life, one that illustrates not only concerns that fall short of conscience 
but also the desirable limits of rights of conscience and the broader range
for discretionary judgments.  Having done some of my early academic
writing on electronic surveillance, in which I strongly supported the need
for judicial approval even when one party to a conversation consents to the
surveillance, I agreed to serve as one of three Deputy Solicitors General 
for a year.  A case within my areas of responsibility involved government
eavesdropping without court orders on organizations vehemently opposed
to the Vietnam War.  The government’s argument was that national security
justified the electronic surveillance.  I thought the government’s behavior
was wrong, even outrageous.  Although I did not think the office should
have refused to help develop the brief if higher officials insisted that the 
case be taken to the Supreme Court, my own moral judgment about the 
practice led to a strong wish not to be involved.  The understanding of 
4. See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should 
They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).  She might think
her moral duties as a nurse to do what she is asked actually outweigh any negative moral 
aspect of her participation.  One who has an objection of conscience ordinarily does not 
think general duties would make performing an act morally preferable.
904
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Erwin Griswold, then Solicitor General, and the generous willingness of
one of the other deputies to take over review of the draft brief allowed
my wish to be ninety-five percent granted.5 
Looking back on those events, my feelings fell short of a genuine 
claim of conscience, as I now understand that term.  I did not believe all 
lawyers should have refused to help, and I did not feel that I would have 
done a serious moral wrong had I worked on the heart of the brief.6 
strongly reject the theory that because those working for the government
necessarily undertake to do all tasks that fall within their ordinary
responsibilities, government employees should never be extended rights 
of conscience.  That is to say, I see no objection in principle to extending 
rights of conscience to some government workers, including government 
lawyers.  Nevertheless, I do believe that anyone taking the position of
Deputy Solicitor General, a fairly high appointive office, should have no
right to refuse tasks assigned by the Solicitor General.  Both for that
reason and because of the nature of my objection to working on the brief, 
whether to grant my wish properly fell within his range of discretion.
Within that range, it makes good sense to accede to wishes like mine if
that can be done without serious inconvenience or an unfair burden on
other workers.  Indeed, if one is focusing on the uses of discretion by
supervisors, it may often be wise to grant accommodations for all sorts
of reasons, ones going well beyond moral objections to participation.
In what respect are claims of conscience narrower than all moral
objections? Martha Nussbaum has suggested that conscience involves 
the search for the ultimate meaning of life.7  That may be one sense of
conscience, but people can have strong convictions of conscience that 
bear only a remote relation to their conceptions of ultimate meaning, if
they have such conceptions.  A more helpful criterion for what counts as 
a claim of conscience is degree of seriousness: how great a wrong does 
someone believe that performing an act would involve, what would they
5. When time pressures produced a request for my assistance with a peripheral
section of the brief, I agreed.
6. It is even questionable whether my wish itself was a question of morality.  My
underlying objection to the surveillance practice was moral, but my wish not to participate in
the brief might be seen as a matter of self-identification.  This is one example of how 
difficult it is to draw a precise line between moral and nonmoral objections to performing 
actions.
 7. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 168–69 (2008). 
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be willing to suffer rather than perform the act, and what do they believe 
they should be willing to suffer?  In respect to adverse consequences, both
belief about what one should be willing to suffer and actual willingness 
to suffer seem relevant.  A moral claim not to participate is of great 
significance if a person believes he should die or suffer huge professional
and financial loss rather than participate, even if he lacks the moral
strength to adhere to that conviction.  But one wonders how honest or 
how deep are such convictions if a person is not actually willing to 
suffer any significant adverse consequences.
Unfortunately, in the real world assessing the magnitude of moral 
convictions is usually extremely difficult.  Even if claimants are sincere, 
other persons are hard put to assess what they mean if they say, “This is
a fundamental conviction of mine.”  And the claimants themselves may
find it difficult to guess what adverse consequences they would undergo 
or think they should be willing to undergo if they know that acceptance 
of their claims will relieve them of those consequences.  This particular 
concern is mitigated if a person making the claim has in fact lost a job 
for failing to perform and is seeking to establish that the firing was 
unjust.  One might believe that insisting that consequences be linked to 
ultimate concerns would alleviate the potential difficulties, but that
seems unlikely.  “Ultimate concern” or the “ultimate meaning of life” 
are themselves rather amorphous concepts, and the required connection 
between a particular conviction and someone’s ultimate concern would 
be bound to be highly imprecise. 
The practical consequence of these difficulties is this: unless those 
making decisions engage in an intense examination of someone who
claims an objection in conscience, they will not be able to distinguish 
genuine claims of conscience from lesser moral objections, and even a
fairly intense examination, such as the sort draft boards undertook for 
conscientious objectors to military service, is hardly reliable.  The best
test of intense conviction is that someone would not assert it falsely
because of natural, unavoidable, negative consequences of doing so. 
Jehovah’s Witnesses would not refuse blood transfusions unless they 
strongly believed they were wrong.  Nurses wishing to be admired by 
colleagues and favored by superiors would probably not lightly decline 
to participate in sterilizations even if their refusals were accorded legal
protection against firing and other forms of negative treatment. 
Whether claims of conscience must be moral raises a perplexing 
question.  A person could feel strongly about pursuing a course of action 
because of (1) an overarching inclination, (2) an inclination without moral 
content but one that reflects a person’s accepted identity, (3) a perceived 
906
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personal moral obligation that does not apply to others, or (4) a perceived 
general moral obligation.  The fourth and first categories are simple.
Commonly, convictions of conscience involve beliefs that the behavior
in question would be wrong for everyone.8  The typical claim not to 
participate in abortions includes a conviction that performing abortions 
is a serious moral wrong.  A person with this view may also believe that 
many women who have abortions, and doctors and nurses who perform 
them, are, wholly or partially, relieved of moral blame, but the reason 
would be their ignorance that what they are doing is deeply wrongful. 
By contrast, not every overarching inclination is a matter of conscience.
A drug addict may accord his highest priority to getting drugs; a husband 
may be obsessed with revenging himself against a man who has stolen 
his wife’s affections.  Such obsessions, recognized as regrettable by the 
very people who are in their throes, do not underlie claims of conscience. 
The second and third categories are more difficult.  Andrew Koppelman
has analyzed Harry Frankfurt’s concept of volitional necessity.9  A person
accedes to a constraining force and is unwilling to oppose that force.
Frankfurt refers to Luther’s, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” as a 
paradigm.  This example is less than ideal for my purpose because of its
religious character, and the likelihood is that Luther probably conceived 
his position in terms that I would classify as moral.  But imagine a man
who becomes so deeply drawn to painting that he is ready to make great 
sacrifices in order to paint.  He comes to identify himself first and foremost
as an artist, and pursuing that career becomes so important to him that he
is willing to accept considerable neglect of his family as a price that
must be paid.  He realizes he is not a great artist and does not suppose 
humanity will suffer if he stops painting, yet his powerful desire to paint 
is a part of himself that he has no desire to shed.  Although it may be an 
extension of standard usage, he might say, “I know my wife and children 
deserve more care than I am providing, but my conscience tells me that I
must paint.” 
Sometimes a person who identifies a strong inclination in herself that 
does not apply to other people may believe it does have moral content. 
Many “callings” to enter into particular vocations fall into this category.
 8. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 3 (2010) (emphasizing the relational dimension of 
conscience not only in the actions it recommends but in the manner of its formation). 
9. See Koppelman, supra note 1, at 234–36. 
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A woman is called to be a teacher, a doctor, or a minister.  She feels
powerfully drawn to this work as a way of assisting or guiding others.
She will see the responsibility to help others as a general moral duty, but
the specific career itself is one to which she in particular is drawn.  She
may have no judgment about who else should follow that career path.
Can any line be drawn between strong individual inclinations that have
this moral element and those that do not, and if so, should they be 
differently treated?  The conceptual defense of the distinction is threatened
by egoistic hedonism and philosophies that posit a moral obligation to 
fully develop one’s capabilities.  According to such philosophies, our
artist might reason, “Admittedly, my pursuit of art is much less than
ideal for my family but it serves my overarching moral responsibility    
to develop myself.”  This problem generates interesting complexities, 
which I will short circuit.  If we are imagining rights of conscience to be 
free of negative consequences if someone declines to perform ordinary
responsibilities, the kind of conscience should involve conceived duties 
that reach beyond oneself.  A nurse should not have a right to decline to 
participate in an operation because she strongly fears it will undermine 
her aesthetic sensibilities.  On the other hand, if ample coworkers are 
available, an official with discretion may reasonably choose to excuse
those with nonmoral reasons to avoid participation. 
Even if moral content that relates to other people should be an element 
of claims of conscience that are treated as rights, drawing the line in 
practice between individualized claims of this kind and those without
relevant moral content will be hard.  It is a thin line between wanting to 
do the interesting and financially rewarding work of a lawyer and
wanting to help others through the law; both aspirants to vocations and 
their practitioners are often less than honest with themselves about their
overriding motivations, not to mention what they reveal to others.10 
Perhaps the best reassurance about this subject is that the kinds of claims 
usually proposed for recognition as legal rights of conscience are ones 
that are most typically made by people who do have objections with
moral content. 
10. During the discussion of the paper at the conference, a question was raised about 
those who commit themselves to others to pursue a course of action that, standing alone, 
is not a question of morality, such as maintaining a healthy diet. Would the commitment
to others turn this into a moral responsibility?  For purposes of rights of conscience, such
voluntary commitments should not transform self-interested reasons into genuinely
moral ones. 
908
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III. RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE AND NONRELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE:
IS THERE A DIFFERENCE, AND SHOULD THEY BE
TREATED DIFFERENTLY? 
As I indicated earlier, I regard most religious claims of conscience as
moral claims that rest on a religious base.  But it may help to begin the 
discussion of religious claims with a further clarification.  Some perceived
religious obligations do not involve behavior toward other people.  A 
believer might say, “It is a matter of conscience for me never to deny the 
truth that Jesus is the Son of God.”  Unless the believer saw this principle as
concerning the benefits of witnessing for other people, the obligation would
not be moral, in the sense of concerning responsibilities toward other
people or nonhuman animals.  Nor would Abraham’s sense that God 
wanted him to sacrifice Isaac.  That involved an obligation to engage in 
behavior toward another person, but the behavior was not designed to
benefit that person.  Similarly, people may feel they are instructed by 
God to hurt or kill others, even when that is not regarded as a form of
punishment. I do not count these perceived obligations as moral.
Without undertaking to draw a precise delineation between moral and
nonmoral and recognizing that any categorization of this sort is bound to 
involve troublesome borderline instances,11 I use the term moral here to
refer to perceptions that behavior toward others will help them or avoid
hurting them, will carry out a deserved consequence for their immoral
behavior, or will avoid helping them engage in immoral behavior.  This
is sufficient to cover the great majority of instances in which religious
persons will have claims of conscience not to carry out ordinary
responsibilities. 
In two important cases interpreting the Selective Service Act, the 
Supreme Court essentially eroded any distinction between religious and 
nonreligious claims to conscientious objection.  To qualify under the 
statute, an objector had to reject participation in “war in any form” based
on “religious training and belief.”12  An amendment to the law responding 
to circuit court decisions mandated that the belief be in “relation to a 
Supreme Being.”13  In United States v. Seeger, the Court dispensed with 
11. See, e.g., supra note 10. 
12. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54
Stat. 885, 889. 
13. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 613. 
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the Supreme Being requirement, ruling that it was sufficient that Seeger’s
conscientious objection “occupies a place in [his] life . . . parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the 
exemption.”14  In Welsh v. United Sates, the applicant had struck the word 
religious from his application, but a plurality said that the exemption
covered those “whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed 
themselves to become part of an instrument of war.”15  Justice Harlan 
represented the fifth vote in Welsh’s favor; he wrote that the statute did
distinguish between religious and nonreligious conscientious objections,
that line was unconstitutional, Congress would have preferred to include the 
relatively small number of nonreligious objectors to invalidation of the
entire provision, and the Court was therefore warranted in expanding the
provision to reach Welsh.16 
The Welsh case raises a number of related but discrete questions.  In
terms of analytical clarity and common understanding, are all claims of 
conscience religious?  Should judges interpret statutes cast in terms of
religion to cover claims of conscience that are not evidently religious, 
either because this is what the legislature apparently intended—obviously
not the basis for Welsh—or based on a more complex theory of
interpretation?  In terms of justifications for protection, are there significant 
differences between religious and nonreligious claims of conscience?
For practical purposes, should the claims always be treated equally or
may it be appropriate to give special protection to religious claims? 
Should the favoring of religious claims always be accepted or always or
sometimes be regarded as unconstitutional? 
On the question of common understanding and analytical clarity, we 
may start with the proposition that some people are nonreligious or
antireligious.  They see no reality beyond ordinary human life and are 
not members of any organization, such as the Ethical Culture Society,
that engages in practices like those of religious organizations.  These
people, like Welsh, may experience claims of conscience.  It is odd, even
perhaps insulting, to assert that they are religious in reaching such 
convictions.  Their convictions are better seen as nonreligious. 
Two conceivable ways to avoid this conclusion are unpersuasive.  One 
way is to say that atheism and agnosticism are themselves religions.  The 
first problem with this strategy is that it is mistaken in its premise;
14. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965). 
15. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
16. Id. at 344–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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atheism and agnosticism are not religions—though they are convictions 
about religion—and I believe people reach the contrary conclusion only 
because they believe it leads to desirable norms about constitutionally
permissible classifications.  But even if one grants the premise about
what count as religions, it does not help in respect to virtually all issues 
of conscience.  Atheism or agnosticism can themselves produce a claim 
of conscience not to be drafted into activities that are designedly 
religious, but they cannot help on whether it is wrong to participate in
war or perform an abortion.  The atheist and the agnostic do not believe 
religious premises are a reliably true guide to how we should treat our 
fellows, and atheism and agnosticism do not by themselves provide 
guidance on most moral issues.  That guidance must come instead from 
reason, intuition, or culture. 
A more plausible way to equate all claims of conscience with religion 
is the idea of ultimate concern or ultimate meaning.  If, as Paul Tillich
famously urged, people’s ultimate concerns are their religion and claims 
of conscience relate to ultimate concerns, then they can all be seen as 
religious.17  One difficulty with this approach is that people may experience
claims of conscience that do not connect in any close way with their
ultimate concern or their sense of ultimate meaning.  A second difficulty 
concerns the application of those concepts to ordinary human life.  Many 
people get through life’s challenges with sets of aspirations and values 
but without any sense of ultimate meaning or concern.  They may value 
their family, their professional life, and aesthetic experience without a 
sense of what it all “means” and without any ordered priority.  If an
“ultimate concern” theory responds that the ultimate concern of such 
people encompasses all those things about which they genuinely care, 
that concept has become so watered down, it signifies very little. 
The existence of nonreligious claims of conscience is not restricted to 
those who are not religious.  Imagine Frank, a religious divorced father 
whose wife has remarried to a man who, Frank acknowledges, is a 
loving and able stepfather.  Frank is offered an extremely attractive and 
17. The Supreme Court relied on Tillich’s work in United States v. Seeger.  Seeger, 
380 U.S. at 180.  The significance of “ultimate concern” is carefully explained and
defended in Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1066–67, 1075–83 (1978), a piece written by John Sexton, now president of New 
York University, John Sexton, NYU LAW, https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.
cfm?section=pubs&personID=20281 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).  I summarize my
disagreement with this approach in GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 132–34. 
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appealing job a thousand miles away.  He refuses the job.  When asked
why, he says, “I could not in good conscience abandon my children. 
This is not a religious matter for me but what I feel as a father I owe my
children.”  Even though Frank believes his children will be able to
flourish in his absence, it might be that with enough thought and discussion 
with coreligionists he would be able to connect his religious convictions 
to his sense of parental duty.  But those connections do not directly
inform his present thoughts and feelings.  We need to recognize that in 
our society many sincerely religious people experience strong obligations
that they do not perceive as flowing from their religious convictions and 
practice.
Beyond supporting the presence of nonreligious claims of conscience, 
this example also suggests how hard it may be to draw a line between
nonreligious and religious claims when people are somewhat religions
and the connection of conscience to religious convictions is weak or 
remote.  The occasional difficulty of drawing the distinction in practice
is one reason to treat religious and nonreligious claims equally.
If analytically we can distinguish between nonreligious moral claims
and religiously based moral claims, does it make sense to do so?  A 
different question is whether religious claims of conscience that are
other than moral should receive greater protection than nonreligious, 
nonmoral claims. 
I shall pass over quickly the interpretation of existing statutes cast in 
terms of religious belief or association.  Barring an unusual legislative
history that points to a very broad sense of “religion” or serious 
constitutional doubts about excluding nonreligious claims, such laws 
should be construed as limited to religion, although in arguable cases the 
boundaries of religion should be conceived generously.18  Unless the
statute itself imposes a restriction, a claim of conscience based on an 
obligation to God—or some other religious source—that does not 
amount to a moral duty should be treated like religiously based moral
claims. 
Sound statutory interpretation does not tell us how legal rights to 
conscience should be formulated or what the constitutional boundaries 
of permissible categorizations should be.  At the country’s founding, the 
right to conscience that was emphasized was the religious liberty to
choose one’s religion and practice free of governmental interference.  It
is debated whether that basic liberty was conceived as covering any right 
18. For a discussion of my views on how the legal boundaries of religion should be
conceived, see  GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 124–56. 
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to be exempt from neutral laws of general application that happened to
interfere with religious practice.  And, in the absence of evidence with
which I am familiar, I assume that the concept of conscience itself was 
broader than the freedom of conscience that played a prominent role in
controversies over state involvement with religion.  That is, I assume 
that if someone had said, “Participation in the institution of slavery would 
violate my conscience,” that would not have seemed a strange use of the 
concept even though it did not touch the speaker’s religious liberty as 
that was conceived in public debate. If all this is right, the founding 
era’s concepts are little help in deciding just when claims of conscience 
should be safeguarded, except perhaps in providing some support for the 
value of respecting conscience and in suggesting that insofar as the Free
Exercise Clause protected conscience, it concerned religious conscience.
Even if my premises about two centuries ago are mistaken, our thinking 
about this subject has developed sufficiently so that judgments about 
when to accommodate must rest primarily on our modern evaluations. 
The notion that similar claims of conscience about the demands of 
morality—say, not to participate in wars, executions, sterilizations, or
sales of morning-after pills—should be treated similarly, whether their 
basis is religious or not, is straightforward.  Whatever may have been
true in ages past, in which it may have been thought that all such serious 
claims of conscience were religious, this is not true today.  One would 
need positive reasons if one were to defend differential treatment.
We may pass over any conceivable argument that in reality nonreligious
claims should actually be favored, perhaps because they reflect independent 
thought.  Given our traditions and our population’s attachment to religion, 
the favoring of nonreligious claims is not practically thinkable.  The 
serious questions are whether favoring religious claims of conscience is
wise and constitutionally appropriate. 
That depends.  For certain kinds of claims, it is hard to imagine a
nonreligious analogue.  A nonreligious person is unlikely to be opposed
to all blood transfusions, to think he has an obligation to wear something 
on his head at all times, or to believe he must withdraw his children from 
school after the eighth grade.  If a right to conscience is to be created in
respect to kinds of claims for which nonreligious claims of conscience 
are difficult to conceive, restricting the right to religious claims may be 
unnecessary, but it would not be unjust. 
More interesting questions are posed when the claims of conscience to
refrain from behavior are ones we can comfortably imagine as being 
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religious or nonreligious.  Someone who is opposed to assisted suicide
may rely on religious or nonreligious grounds; on either basis she might 
conclude that withdrawing life support amounts to assisted suicide and is 
an action in which she should not participate.  One possible basis to 
favor religious claims is a tradition of some accommodation to religious
conscience.  For me, the argument from tradition is less powerful for 
legislative choice than for constitutional permissibility, and I do not
regard it as decisive even in the latter context.  Another possible ground 
to favor religious claims is that more is at stake for the typical believer;
God may punish wrongdoers when this life is over.  A basic problem 
with this assumption is that so much depends on the particular religion’s 
assumptions.  The nonbeliever may reasonably respond that behaving 
morally in this life matters more for her than for someone who is 
convinced that a loving God forgives all confessed sins. 
A more promising basis of distinction concerns the underlying grounds of
claims.  The religious believer will usually be relying on a claim about 
what is morally right that applies generally and depends in part on 
religion’s premises.  A Roman Catholic who assumes that natural law
reasoning establishes the unacceptability of abortion is bolstered in that 
conviction by the teaching of the church.  Although governments must
implicitly reject various claims about religious truth in policies they 
adopt—fighting wars rejects the premise that God instructs us to be 
pacifists—nonetheless the government is not highly competent to
evaluate assertions of religious truth and should steer clear of them when
it can. 
Nonreligious claims of conscience are more likely either to reflect
individualized reactions that avoid general claims about truth or to rest 
on claims whose evaluation by the government is more acceptable.  If
the claimant relies on secular reason to conclude that in all circumstances 
withdrawing life support is killing, the government may respond that this 
view is unreasonable given a dominant opinion to the contrary within the 
medical community and among others who have thought carefully about
the issue. 
I do not want to suggest that the contrast I have drawn puts all 
religious claims on one side and all nonreligious ones on the other.
Some religious claims may explicitly involve a sense of what is right 
that does not reach beyond the individual: for example, “Prayer has led
me to know this would be wrong for me, whatever may be right for 
others.”  And some general claims based on religious premises may be 
shown to be mistaken by nonreligious reason.  Roman Catholics and
many other Christians believe that wars just in their origin that are 
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fought according to moral principles, such as not intentionally killing 
innocent civilians, are morally acceptable.  Suppose such a believer 
concludes that he cannot fight in a war because the United States is
aiming only to expand its control of oil reserves and is wantonly killing 
innocent civilians.  Both of these factual premises could be wrong and
known to be so by relevant government officials and well-informed
outsiders.  Nonetheless, despite these counterexamples, the general 
desirability of the government’s avoiding claims of religious truth is 
one basis for accession to religious claims of conscience. 
About my suggestion that the government’s competence may be 
greater and its exercise of judgment more appropriate, in respect to
nonreligious moral claims than religious ones, Adam Kolber responded 
in commentary on my paper that the better line may be between
empirical claims, as to which the government’s competence is substantial, 
and claims of value, as to which its competence is much weaker.19   I
agree that the government’s competence may be greatest for ordinary
empirical questions.20  But I also think that in respect to nonreligious claims
about value, secular reason has a significant role, and dominant opinion 
may be important, and that therefore public officials are typically in a 
stronger position to assert such claims than they are with respect to
religious claims of value. 
A final reason to prefer religious claims may be that it is simpler to
judge their sincerity because such claimants usually, though far from 
always, have been attached to religious organizations that share a particular
view.  This particular reason carries no weight when the claim of
conscience is one that would be extremely unlikely to be made insincerely. 
Nurses are unlikely to refuse to participate in sterilizations, for example,
unless they have a sincere objection because there is no independent 
advantage to be gained by nonparticipation.21 
The general lessons to be drawn from this analysis are debatable.  I
conclude that for most subjects as to which both religious and
nonreligious claims of conscience about moral requirements are likely to
arise, any right of conscience should include the nonreligious claims. 
 19. Adam J. Kolber, Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience, 47 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 919, 920–26 (2010). 
20. I add the word ordinary to put aside such questions as whether Jesus performed 
miracles and whether his body was resurrected after his death.
21. Of course, the existence of a sincere objection might or might not amount to a 
sense that participation would amount to a serious moral wrong. 
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That is both because the claims are similar enough to warrant comparable
treatment and because there is some reason to accommodate deeply held 
convictions even when they are demonstrably mistaken.  Nevertheless, 
the special reasons to accommodate religious conscience should be a 
crucial part of the discussion whether any right or privilege should be 
granted. 
This conclusion raises a separate important question to which I shall 
devote fleeting attention. How should the law regard nonmoral claims
made on religious or nonreligious grounds?  Two examples that have 
arisen in American prison cases are claims by inmates that they should
be given special diets or be permitted to wear beards of a certain length. 
It is fairly easy to see that a typical religious claim of this kind could be
a claim of conscience.  In the most straightforward case, the believer 
thinks he is obligated to God to act in accord with God’s dictates, with
perhaps a secondary obligation to the community of fellow believers. 
The believer does not perceive his attachment to the religion as itself a 
simple voluntary act.22  The nonreligious person with a similar wish is
not likely to have a comparable sense of an obligation to an entity 
outside himself.  One may hesitate, at least in most instances, to see his
claim to engage in the behavior as one of conscience.  In any event, 
whatever the theoretical conceptualization, I think the sense of obligation 
to an entity beyond oneself that is so important for most religious believers
is a powerful enough reason to warrant giving legal protection to some
religious claims of conscience that do not involve moral conclusions, 
while protection is denied for nonreligious, nonmoral claims.  No reason
comparable to the believer’s sense of obligation to a higher authority
applies when a nonbeliever’s sense of what the nonbeliever should do is
outside the realm of morality.23 
In one significant domain, I would limit a right of conscience to
religious claimants.  When a right is claimed by institutions rather than 
individuals, religious organizations have a strong sense of commitment, 
and a degree of independence from the state, that warrants respect.
When nonreligious organizations are created for particular purposes,
such as medical care, there is much less reason to permit them to decline 
services that are generally required. 
The range of what should be constitutionally permissible is itself a 
complex topic.  Present doctrine requires virtually no accommodation to 
22. Cf. supra note 10. 
23. I am not considering completely independent grounds to be relieved from ordinary
requirements, such as medical conditions and disabilities.  It may well be appropriate to 
adopt legal standards providing protections of these bases for special treatment. 
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religion but broadly permits accommodation.  If too much is demanded
of private employers, required accommodation turns into forbidden
establishment.  The Supreme Court has never specifically held that a 
permitted accommodation to religion that a legislature has granted must
be matched by an equal accommodation to nonreligious conviction, but 
the draft cases came close to this.  The Court’s reading of Congress’s
language in Seeger and Welsh is so strained that the results may suggest
what Justice Harlan explicitly concluded in the latter case: that in that 
context an exemption restricted to religious conscience is impermissible. 
In my opinion, when a legislature favors religious claimants, a court 
should consider whether nonreligious claims of conscience about
morally appropriate action are closely similar.  If they are, and if there 
are not strong independent reasons to prefer religious claimants, a court 
should rule that the Equal Protection Clause and the Establishment 
Clause require equal treatment. 
IV. CODA
What I have written here is mainly a preliminary to the crucial
questions about government recognition of claims of conscience.  In
what arenas of social life should such claims be protected and how far 
should they be protected?  What connection to a controversial procedure 
should be sufficient?  For example, should admissions personnel be
permitted to refuse to do paperwork for patients who will receive abortions?  
Should protections extend to forbid responses by private employers as
well as to guard against government restrictions?  Should protections be 
limited to behavior about which the citizenry is seriously divided, such 
as abortion, or extend to outlooks that are highly idiosyncratic?  How far 
should a right or privilege of conscience extend when it runs up against 
the desirable provision of services for those who seek them or impedes 
the efficient operations of companies providing services and their fair
treatment of other workers?  How should the government respond when
those who seek a commodity or service and those who want to avoid 
participating in providing it have competing claims of conscience?24 
Should rights be crafted by specific legislative or administrative measures, 
say regarding participation by doctors and nurses in abortions and
sterilizations, or druggists in the sale of specified drugs, or should a
24. Such conflicts are a major theme in VISCHER, supra note 8. 
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formulation be in general terms, with disputed applications to be resolved 
by courts, as under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,25 the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,26 and Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, as amended?27  Designing desirable protections for 
conscience depends on the addressing of all of these inquiries.  Our 
exploration of the relevant meanings of conscience and the divide between
religious and nonreligious conscience forms only a small part of the total 
effort that is needed. 
I should also be explicit that my focus on rights of conscience, the 
subject of the conference for which this paper was written, is not intended 
as an implicit assertion that conscience should dominate conceptions of
religion or supplant an institutional approach under the religion clauses.
I have implicitly proposed that responding to individual claims of
conscience is one significant feature of protecting free exercise of religion, 
but I resist the idea that one must choose at some very general level 
between individual and institutional approaches.  Both are relevant.  Only in
the context of some particular issues need one decide which should take 
priority.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). 
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